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INTRODUCTION

What is the point of writing? What impact is it meant to have on the
world, and what impact does it actually have? These are questions that all
academic researchers are called upon to answer, at some point, for
themselves or for others. They seem to arise more often and with extra
urgency in relation to feminist research. Feminist scholarship must justify
itself not only to the usual skeptics who doubt the need for independent,
non-instrumental knowledge production, but also to two other audiences.
The academic world continues to grapple with its suspicion that feminist
ideas are, by definition, too political to be scholarly, while feminist activists
may question whether research is sufficiently political to be strategically
useful. Individually, we struggle to define the appropriate connections and
boundaries between our scholarly work and our practical commitments to
progressive, feminist social change. The 2004 Betcherman Lecture,
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delivered jointly by Susan Boyd and Claire Young,1 should provoke a
vigorous collective discussion about the impact of feminist research on law
and public policy and on the lives of women.
Focusing on Supreme Court of Canada judgments in tax and family
law since the 1980s, when feminist research began to flourish in these areas,
Boyd and Young tell a discomfiting story of failure or, at best, temporary
victories that have been eroded or erased by an anti-feminist backlash. They
provide a persuasive diagnosis of how gender equality concerns are being
submerged within judicial analysis by a renewed emphasis on individual
choice and private, familial responsibility for economic security. In this
sense their article offers a potentially helpful overarching framework for
understanding what feminist law reform efforts must contend with in the
current political and jurisprudential milieu. These disturbing trends should
not, however, lead us to conclude that feminist research has had no
meaningful or lasting impact on law and public policy. This is where I may
take issue with Boyd and Young's rather disheartening analysis. I would not
want to overstate the degree to which policy reforms have been driven by
feminist research, or to suggest there is not a long way to go. However, I
suggest that its impact must be measured on many levels and with attention
to indirect and often unintended effects. Using examples from tax law, I
argue that feminist ideas have influenced the direction of reform on
occasion, though not always in ideal or predictable ways. This exercise
brings to light some important aspects of progress that are otherwise
overlooked or undervalued. Yet it also demonstrates that characterizing
any law reform effort as either an outright "success" or a "failure" tends to
obscure its uneven impact on women in different social locations.
Specifically, this comment is an opportunity to explore the economic
polarization of women and what it means for feminist legal reform
struggles.
As Boyd and Young suggest, both family and tax law present some
stark tensions between class and gender equality interests. Legal feminists
have for some time acknowledged the challenge this poses, especially for
crafting inclusive litigation strategies. 2 However, there is a need for sharper
1 Susan B. Boyd & Claire F.L. Young, "Feminism, Law, and Public
Policy: Family Feuds and
Taxing Times" (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 545.
2 See e.g. Nitya Iyer, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity"
(1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 179; Audrey Macklin, "Symes v. M.N.R.: Where Sex Meets Class" (1992) 5
C.J.W.L. 498; Mary Jane Mossman & Morag MacLean, "Family Law and Social Assistance Programs:
Rethinking Equality" in Patricia Evans & Gerda Wekerle, eds., Women and the CanadianWelfare State:
Challengesand Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Claire F.L. Young, "(In)visible
Inequalities: Women, Tax and Poverty" (1995) 27 Ottawa L. Rev. 99; Claire F.L. Young, "Taxing Times
for Lesbians and Gay Men: Equality at What Cost?" (1994) 17 Dal. L.J. 534.
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analysis of the growing social and economic power of class privileged
women and men, both as an effect of the neo-liberal trends identified by
Boyd and Young, and as a possible unintended side effect of feminist legal
struggles. Acknowledging the different interests that women bring to the
table is threatening because it may undermine political solidarity or
theoretical coherence. But it is more dangerous to avoid or gloss over the
issue of class polarization among women. Analyzing the classed nature of
gender inequality is necessary to ensure the integrity and quality of feminist
research in law. It will allow a more accurate assessment of the likely
impacts of particular law reform strategies, and the trade-offs being made
among different groups of women. Ultimately, it will also strengthen the
credibility of feminist political claims, which are now too easily countered
by pointing to the small group of women who have gained access to the
professional and business elites.
II.

POSITIVE IMPACTS ON MANY LEVELS

Scholarly research rarely leads directly to legislative or common law
reforms. If it did, there would be no need for political advocacy or activism.
Feminist research is better understood as working gradually to establish the
epistemic conditions for political and policy change. That is, feminist
scholars have their greatest impact in expanding what can be known and
what questions can be asked about the world. At a basic level they have
unsettled the common sense understanding of sex as a purely natural or
biologically based difference, and have provided an alternative knowledge
of gender as a socially constructed set of power relations. Though never
fully complete or uncontested, this discursive shift has opened space for a
wide variety of political claims to be voiced and to resonate with policymakers and the wider public. Ironically, the impact of feminist ideas may
become less visible the more they are incorporated as part of mainstream
assumed truth, and are pursued in turn by other researchers working
outside an explicitly feminist frame.
Success or failure, then, cannot be measured only by reference to
majority decisions in the Supreme Court of Canada, or major legislative
reforms. It is equally reflected in the way power is exercised at the microlevel in family relationships, the workplace, the administration of
government programs, or in decisions about the marketing and
consumption of goods and services. Though harder to quantify, I argue that
these more remote impacts are at least as meaningful as high profile legal
victories in determining the quality of women's lives.
This is not to dismiss the need for critical analysis of judicial
discourse of the kind offered in the Boyd and Young lecture. Since the
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advent of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms,3 particularly its
equality rights provisions, feminist law reform campaigns have often
centred around high profile litigation strategies. There has also been a
significant amount of feminist scholarship examining what laws should be
challenged, how best to argue the cases, and how judges should apply the
Charterto improve gender equality in different legal contexts. As such it
does make sense to track litigation outcomes as a possible indicator of the
impact of feminist research on law and public policy. Perhaps the most
direct evidence of such an impact is not who won the case, however, but
whether feminist research is cited or otherwise relied upon in the reasons.
Indeed, we should count such moments as significant even in cases that are
lost in the result.
Boyd and Young note that an important contribution of feminist
legal scholarship has been to show how "women's lives were disciplined, or
regulated, by the discourses in judicial decisions, even when they might
appear to 'win' a case," for example by perpetuating ideologies of good and
bad mothering. 4 However, their article gives less attention to the converse
possibility, that is the progressive impact of "losing" cases. A high profile
loss for feminists can nonetheless contain partial improvements in judicial
reasoning, as well as help to create the conditions for future progress.
While this may seem cold comfort to the parties or advocates taking the
case forward, there is a danger of missing out on some valuable silver
linings if only winning cases are seen to have a positive impact. We also risk
not noticing that the failed litigation has moved the law in a direction that
benefits some women but leaves out others.
III.

LOSING CASES BUT WINNING GROUND

All of these points can be illustrated by examining more closely the
two tax cases that are highlighted by Boyd and Young: Thibaudeau v.
Canada,5 an unsuccessful Charterchallenge to the taxation of child support
payments, and Symes v. Canada,6 an unsuccessful attempt to characterize
child care costs as a fully deductible business expense. Though both
claimants lost in the Supreme Court of Canada, their cases generated some
notably progressive judicial discourse in the lower courts, in dissenting
3Part 1 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [Charter].
4 Supra note 1 at
549.
5[1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 [Thibaudeau].
6 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 [Symes].
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judgments, and even in Justice Iacobucci's majority reasons in Symes.
Furthermore, both generated significant media and public discussion, and
both were followed by legislative changes that at least partially vindicated
the gender equality arguments made in court. An investigation of this
fallout suggests not only that legal feminists may have had more impact
than what appears on the surface, but also that this work has benefited
some women much more than others. In particular, the expansion of the
child care expense deduction following Symes, combined with the failure of
governments to invest directly in public child care services, has fed directly
into the class inequality of women in Canada.
A.

Thibaudeau v. Canada

Boyd and Young cite the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Thibaudeau as an example of judicial erasure of gender equality concerns
and rejection of feminist advocacy and research. While agreeing with their
analysis of the majority judgment, I would argue that the bigger story came
after the decision was rendered. The media coverage of the case was
intense and allowed Suzanne Thibaudeau herself, as well as feminist
lawyers, academics, and activists to argue in public why the outcome was
unfair to separated and divorced women and their children. The outcry
prompted the federal government to strike a national task force chaired by
the Honourable Sheila Finestone to hold hearings and advise on possible
reforms. Following the report of the task force (which was never made
public), the government effectively overruled the Court by announcing it
would amend the Income Tax Act7 to deny a deduction to child support
payers, and remove taxation from child support recipients.8 While it is true,
as Boyd and Young point out, that lobbying by women's groups was critical
in achieving this change, these groups also relied on feminist research to
help them challenge the technical tax policy arguments held up to defend
the law, and to demonstrate the relationship between taxation of child
support and post-divorce poverty of sole-parent women. One of the main
points of contention in this debate was whether the tax burden was, or
could be, addressed simply by ensuring that the amount of child support
awards was "grossed up" by lawyers and judges to cover the associated
income tax. On this issue, feminist scholarship helped to convince policymakers that the "gross up" solution was not viable given the realities of

R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.
1.
8 Canada, Budget Plan Tabled in the House of Commons by the HonourablePaulMartin, P.C., M.P.,
Minister of Finance, (6 March 1996) at 151-52.
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unequal bargaining power during marriage breakdown. 9 Viewed from a
post-litigation perspective, we might count the Thibaudeau case as a
significant success.
B.

Symes v. Canada

Beth Symes' bid to deduct the full cost of her nanny's salary as a
business expense was always controversial among feminists. The claim was
seen by many to serve only privileged self-employed women, and as too
acquiescent in the private nanny system and its systemic exploitation of low
income, immigrant women of colour. However, feminist scholars have
generally condemned the Supreme Court's unwillingness to interfere with
the patently inadequate child care expense deduction in section 63 of the
Income Tax Act. Boyd and Young strongly criticize the decision, arguing
that in contrast to contemporary developments in family law, "tax law
remained impervious to a substantive equality analysis of issues such as the
gendered nature of caregiving and inequality in the labour force."'° I would
suggest, however, that such critiques have focused too heavily on the result
in the case, and not enough on those aspects of the majority judgment that
made significant breakthroughs in opening tax law to gender analysis. I will
comment specifically on that part of Symes' argument that relied not upon
the Charter, but on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
Income Tax Act.
The first breakthrough came in the majority's decision that it would
not simply follow the precedents that characterized child care costs as
"personal expenses," which cannot be deducted in computing a taxpayer's
business income. Rather, it would ignore the previous Canadian case law
on the point as well as the nineteenth century English precedent on which
it was based, and examine the proper characterization of child care
expenses within the general principles of income tax law. Justice lacobucci
wrote,
The decision to characterize child care expenses as personal expenses was made by judges.
As part of our case law, it is susceptible to re-examination in an appropriate case.... The
increased participation of women in the Canadian workforce is undoubtedly a change in the
"social foundation" .... Accordingly, I do not feel that I must slavishly follow those cases

9See e.g. Lisa Philipps & Margot Young, "Sex, Tax and the Charter: A Review
of Thibaudeau v.
Canada" (1995) 2 Rev. Const. Stud. 221; Lisa Philipps, "Tax Law: Equality Rights: Thibaudeau v.
Canada" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 668; Ellen Zweibel & Richard Shillington, Child Support Policy:
Income Tax Treatment and Child Support Guidelines (Ottawa: Policy Research Centre on Children,
Youth, and Families, undated) at 10-17.
10
Supra note 1 at 559.
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which have characterized child care expenses as personal in nature.11

The majority went on to consider the various tests that have been
applied to distinguish "personal" from "business" expenses in tax law. In

doing so it made a second important breakthrough by admitting that this
distinction has a subjective element and is vulnerable to gender biased
assumptions about the division between productive and domestic life.
In this section of the judgment, Justice Iacobucci relied directly on
feminist sociological and legal research, quoting in particular the following

passage from Audrey Macklin:
[A]s long as business has been the exclusive domain of men, the commercial needs of
business have been dictated by what men (think they) need to expend in order to produce
income. The fact that these expenditures also have a "personal" element was never treated
as a complete bar .... It seems closer to the truth to suggest that these practices inhere in the
way men, or some men, engage in business. Of course, since men have (until very recently)
been the only people engaging in business, it is easy enough to conflate the needs of
businessmen and the needs of business. Women's needs in doing business will necessarily be
different, and one might reasonably demand a reconceptualization of "business expenses"
that reflects the changing composition of the business class.' 2

The Court then stated that "it is difficult to argue that history has
not conflated the 'needs of businessmen with the needs of business' as
Professor Macklin suggests.",13 Having accepted this analysis, the Court
appeared torn about how to characterize Symes' nanny expenses observing
that "[i]t can be difficult to weigh the personal and business elements at
play. ' 14 Unfortunately, the majority decided it was not required to resolve
this conundrum because the partial deduction allowed under section 63 was
intended to be a complete code for deduction of child care expenses, thus
precluding Symes from claiming her full costs under the broader deduction

for business expenses.
This was certainly a disappointing turn in the reasons. Given the
majority's initial eagerness to get to the root of the business/personal
Supra note 6 at 728-29.
12 Macklin, supra note 2 at 507-08. The list of authorities cited in the judgment includes at least
twelve feminist works, including such items as Grace Blumberg, "Sexism in the Code: A Comparative
Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers" (1971-1972) 21 Buff. L. Rev. 49; Kathleen
Mahoney, "Daycare and Equality in Canada" in Research Studies of the Commission on Equality in
Employment (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985) 157; and Claire F.L. Young, "Impact of
Feminist Analysis on Tax Law and Policy" in Feminist Analysis: Challenging Law and Legal
Processes 1992 Institute of ContinuingLegal Education (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association-Ontario,
1992).
13 Supra note 6 at 743-44.
14 Ibid. at 742.
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distinction, and its refreshing openness to the possibility of gender bias in
the conceptual foundations of tax law, it seemed to be a formalistic and
disingenuous conclusion. However, this should take nothing away from the
progress that was made in challenging the axiomatic treatment of child care
expenses as personal, and in admitting the relevance of gender analysis to
the interpretation of technical income tax rules. The business/personal
distinction is a key pillar of our tax system. It underpins many of the specific
rules and is always vulnerable to gender bias because it maps so closely onto
the market/family divide in liberal ideology. Rather than focusing
exclusively on the fact that Symes lost, feminist (and other) advocates could
cite the case in the future to show that the business/personal distinction is
in flux, and should be applied in a way that avoids gender bias. 5
Counting Symes only as a loss also neglects the power of the
progressive statements made in dissenting and lower court judgments in the
case, which clearly drew upon feminist research in a number of ways. The
Federal Court (Trial Division) initially held in Symes' favour, with Justice
Cullen quoting extensively in his reasons from the expert testimony of
feminist sociologist Patricia Armstrong on the mass entry of women into
the paid labour force and the detrimental effect of child care
responsibilities on their income earning capacities.16 1was a junior associate
at a law firm when this decision came down and took part in some of the
heated discussions among lawyers at the firm about the merits of the ruling
and the equality of women in the profession more generally. The point is
that regardless of one's view of the case and its final result, it undeniably
raised consciousness and provoked more open discussion of these issues
among senior lawyers. These are the people who decide on matters such as
maternity leave policies at law firms, the criteria for awarding partnership
status, and the availability and remuneration of part-time and other
alternative employment arrangements. They also advise corporate clients
concerning their obligations toward employees, and make arguments in
court about the proper interpretation of employment and antidiscrimination laws.
The dissenting judgment of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 (concurred in
by Justice McLachlin, as she then was) in the Supreme Court should also
be counted as a mark of progress. The dissent incorporated feminist
15 Examples of situations where this argument might be helpful include the deductibility
of home
office expenses; the characterization of employer-paid child care as a taxable benefit (because it is
"personal," rather than a condition of employment); and the question of when a small business has a
"personal" element such that it must show a reasonable expectation of profit in order for expenses to
be deducted.
16
Symes v. Canada, [1989] 3 F.C. 59 at 71-73 (T.D.).
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research and discussed gender equality principles at length and contested
the logic and objectivity of the majority judgment. I have found it to be a
powerful tool in the classroom for exploring with students the difference
that gender might make in tax law and in adjudication more broadly. The
influence that high level dissenting judgments can have in shaping future
developments in the law is also well known.
III.

CLASS POLARIZATION AMONG WOMEN

Beyond the importance of the judgments themselves, I suggest that
the Symes litigation helped to increase political pressure on the federal
government to take some form of action on the lack of affordable child
care. Yet it likely has also contributed to a trend whereby the government
continually fails to invest directly in public child care services and instead
repeatedly increases the maximum that can be deducted under section 63
of the Income Tax Act by those who incur private child care costs. Not long
after the trial decision in favour of Symes was overturned by the Federal
Court of Appeal, 17 the government announced it would increase the child
care expense deduction by 1 thousand to 5 thousand dollars per child under
seven, and $3,000 per child seven or over, proclaiming that,
The child care expense deduction provides important recognition of the costs incurred by
single parents and two-earner families. Through this deduction the federal government
provides about $300 million in tax assistance to over 600,000 taxpayers, of whom threequarters are women.' 8

When the Conservative government lost power to the Liberals in
1993, their election platform included the famous promise of a national
child care program. The government reneged on this promise, as it has on
repeated promises since that time to provide significant new direct child
care funding. Instead, it has continued to increase the maximum child care
expense deduction, currently at $7,000 per child under seven, and $4,000
per child seven or over." This approach has been harshly criticized by
17

Symes v. Canada, [1991] 3 F.C. 507 (C.A.).
18 Budget Papers Tabled in the House of Commons by the Honourable Don Mazankowski, Minister
of Finance (25 February 1992) at 136-37.
19 Based purely on personal experience and anecdotal evidence, a taxpayer who meets all the
conditions for claiming the maximum deduction under section 63 can now deduct well over half the cost
of a spot in a regulated, non-profit daycare centre, provided one can find a space, but still less than half
the cost of a full-time in-home caregiver. Interestingly, the deduction for business meals and
entertainment expenses has been cut back to 50 per cent of the actual cost incurred (Income TaxAct,
s. 67.1). The favourable treatment of entertainment expenses relative to child care expenses, criticized
by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in her dissent in Symes, appears to have been largely eliminated.
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women's advocates for a number of reasons including the following: (i) it
has not improved working conditions or wages for child care providers; (ii)
it has not addressed the shortage of spaces in affordable, regulated child
care programs; and (iii) the deduction is designed in a way that gives
minimal or no assistance to many lower income parents.
This history suggests that legal feminists need to ask some searching
questions about how the Symes litigation has in fact influenced law and
public policy in a way that may benefit some women at the expense of
others. While women's advocates have continued to lobby strenuously for
direct child care funding, it is unclear what role the Symes case and the
subsequent increases in the child care expense deduction have played in
dividing constituencies and defusing political pressure for public daycare.
In any event, the policy preference for tax deductions over direct funding
contributes directly to the polarization of women along class lines.
Income tax statistics show that tax filers with incomes of 100
thousand dollars or more account for only about 3 per cent of all returns
filed, and about 21 per cent of this group are women. 20 This is roughly the
group for whom the child care expense deduction is most favourable, as
they have sufficient income to afford large child care expenses and are
generally taxed in the highest bracket, making the deduction more
valuable. 21 By contrast, about 24 per cent of all returns filed show an
income of 10 thousand dollars or less, and of these 63.5 per cent are filed
by women and 36.5 per cent by men. The child care expense deduction is
of little or no assistance to these individuals even if they can afford to pay
over the table for child care, as they have little if any tax liability to
eliminate after claiming the basic personal credit. Aggregate statistics about
women can occlude these sorts of disparities by suggesting that all women
suffer equally from average gender gaps in income or other indicators.
Sylvia Walby has made the case that slightly more disaggregated data can
reveal that the situation of women is more complex and is changing.22 Her
study found that women in the United Kingdom and the European Union
had significantly increased their representation in the highest level jobs,
with a simultaneous growth of women's employment at the bottom of the
20 Canada Revenue Agency, "Final Statistics-Sample Data 2003 Edition (2001 taxation year),"
online: <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/agency/stats/gbOl/pst/final/menu-e.html>. Figures derived from
Summary of Basic Tables 2 and Final Basic Table 6.
21 In 2001 the top federal rate of 29 per cent applied to taxable income exceeding 100 thousand
dollars (Income TaxAct, s. 117(2)).
22 Sylvia Walby, "The Restructuring of the Gendered Political Economy: Transformations in
Women's Employment" in Joanne Cook, Jennifer Roberts & Georgina Waylen, eds., Towards a
Gendered PoliticalEconomy (London: Macmillan Press, 2000) 165 at 168.
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labour market in part-time, precarious jobs, suggesting growing
polarization. Walby argues these are "very significant transformations
which need to be understood rather than denied" by feminist researchers. 3
Recent Canadian studies show that class inequality also affects selfemployed women. The surging growth of self-employment during the
1990s, especially among women, has not improved women's economic wellbeing across the board. Rather, self-employment falls along a spectrum
ranging from those earning good incomes in full-time professional or other
business activities, to others who work part-time with low incomes and
minimal access to health insurance or other social benefits.24 Women are
over-represented at the less privileged end of this range, and more often
than men are pushed into self-employment due to job loss or the difficulty
of finding a job that is sufficiently flexible to accommodate family
responsibilities. Some women (like Beth Symes) do make it into the ranks
of the better-off self-employed, but many others are stuck with and
inadequate income and dependency on a male breadwinner for support.
The child care expense deduction is very poorly suited to assist these lower
income women, as a self-employed person who works long hours without
making a profit cannot claim her child care costs under section 63. Unlike
business expenses that can be carried forward and deducted in a later year
if the business is in a loss position, the child care expense deduction
requires that the taxpayer must have sufficient "earned income" to cover
the expenses in the year they are claimed.
IV.

POLICY IMPACT UNDER THE PUBLIC RADAR

Feminist research sometimes has influence in fora that are less
public than litigation-for example in policy consultations or legislative
lobbying. Such work is often invisible to the public, especially if the result
is simply to prevent implementation of a change that would be detrimental
to gender equality. For example, women's groups drew on feminist research
in lobbying successfully against the replacement of old age security with a
marital-unit based Seniors' Benefit as proposed in the 1996 budget, and
23

Ibid. at 166.
Karen D. Hughes, Gender and Self-employment in Canada: Assessing Trends and
Policy
Implications (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, 1999); Leah F. Vosko & Nancy Zukewich,
"Precarious by 'Choice': Gender and Self-Employment" in Leah F. Vosko, ed., PrecariousEmployment:
UnderstandingLabour Market Insecurity (Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press,
2000).
25 Karen D. Hughes, "Pushed or Pulled? Women's Entry into Self-Employment and Small
24

Business Ownership" (2003) 10 Gender, Work and Org. 433.
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against Reform Party proposals in the mid-1990s to give tax benefits to
more "traditional" single-earner couples. The introduction of a caregiver
credit in 1998 must also be attributed in part to extensive feminist research
and advocacy on valuing unpaid work during the 1990s. I have criticized the
design of the credit elsewhere for problems such as its low amount and its
delivery of benefits to breadwinners instead of directly to unpaid
caregivers.26 I have argued that it is an example of how feminist ideas can
be appropriated and distorted to serve contrary political interests, such as
legitimating the privatization of caregiving costs by shifting health care,
elder care, and other responsibilities from public sector employees to
unpaid family members, usually women. Examining the impact of feminist
research will likely involve critiquing its partial or flawed implementation
more often than celebrating its outright success, yet these are undeniably
in part the impacts of our work.
Finally, it is important to note the influence of feminist work on
other public policy research. Examples include the Ontario Fair Tax
Commission of the mid-1990s that included a Women and Taxation
Working Group and made several recommendations for improving gender
equality, 27 the Law Commission of Canada's 2001 recommendations for
revising the tax treatment of relationships,28 and the recent report by the
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives on the gender and class
distributional effects of tax reform platforms in the 2004 federal election.2 9
While such reports seldom result in immediate or dramatic policy changes,
they do help to create momentum and consensus for change over the
longer-term, or to raise political resistance to other, regressive proposals.
Such gains may be less inspiring than winning a case in the Supreme Court
of Canada. They should nonetheless be scrutinized by feminist researchers
to determine not only how we have affected the world in a positive way, but
also what further research is needed to understand the ambivalent and
sometimes problematic effects of past reforms.

26 See Lisa Philipps, "Tax Law and Social Reproduction: The Gender of Fiscal Policy in an Age
of Privatization" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization, Law and the Challenge to
Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 41 at 61-70.
27
FairTaxation in a Changing World: Highlightsof the Report of the OntarioFairTax
Commission
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) at 28-29.
28 Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal
Adult Relationships (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2001) at 63-89.
29 Sheila Block & Ellen Russell, "Who benefits? A Gender and Distributional Analysis of Election
Income Tax Promises," 6(3) Behind the Numbers (22 June 2004).

